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THE PRESUMPTION OF CORRECTNESS: SHOULD THE
COMMISSIONER BE REQUIRED TO CARRY THE
INITIAL BURDEN OF PRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
When the Commissioner of Internal Revenue' conducts an examina-
tion of a tax return and determines that a taxpayer has not reported in-
come,2 he issues a deficiency notice3 on that unreported income.
Traditionally, when the deficiency notice was presented to the court by
the Commissioner, a presumption of correctness attached to it,4 estab-
1. I.R.C. § 7801(a) (1986) provides that the "administration and enforcement of [the
Internal Revenue Code] shall be performed by or under the supervision of the Secretary
of the Treasury." Within the department of the Treasury, the "Commissioner of Internal
Revenue [has] such duties and powers as may be prescribed by the Secretary." I.R.C.
§ 7802 (1986). The Secretary has delegated the administration and enforcement of the
Internal Revenue Code [Code] to the Commissioner. See M. Saltzman, IRS Practice and
Procedure 1 1.02, at 1-3 (1981).
2. The Commissioner facilitates voluntary compliance with the Code by examining
tax returns. See I Internal Revenue Manual, Administration (CCH), P4-21, at 1303-73
(1981) [hereinafter Administration Manual] (objective of examining returns is "to pro-
mote the highest degree of voluntary compliance on the part of taxpayers"); see also
United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 145 (1975) (examinations are performed to insure
that each individual complies with the tax laws and bears his or her tax burden); I R.
Fink, Tax Fraud § 1.01, at 1-2 (1985) (same); M. Garbis, Federal Tax Litigation, Civil
Practice and Procedure 1.01, at 1-2 (1985) (same); A. Santa Barbara, Internal Revenue
Service, Practice and Procedure 273 (1977) (same).
An income tax examination also provides a determination of the correct income tax
liability of the person or entity under examination. See 1 Internal Revenue Manual, Au-
dit 120(3), at 7239-9 (1981) [hereinafter Audit Manual]; A. Santa Barbara, supra, at 273.
3. A deficiency notice is sent to the taxpayer when "the Secretary determines that
there is a deficiency in respect of any tax." See I.R.C. § 6212(a) (1986). A deficiency
notice serves to "give the taxpayer notice that the Commissioner means to assess a defi-
ciency tax against him and to give him an opportunity to have such ruling reviewed by
the Tax Court before it becomes effective." See Commissioner v. Stewart, 186 F.2d 239,
241 (6th Cir. 1951); see also Olsen v. Helvering, 88 F.2d 650, 651 (2d Cir. 1937) (communi-
cation that informs taxpayer of Commissioner's intentions and his procedural options is
sufficient).
The Code requires the Commissioner to mail the deficiency notice to the taxpayer
before he can make any assessment or initiate or prosecute any collection proceedings.
See I.R.C. § 6213(a) (1986). The mailing starts the period of limitations within which the
taxpayer must file a petition in the Tax Court if he wants access to that court. Id. Mail-
ing of the deficiency notice also restricts the Commissioner from determining "any addi-
tional deficiency of income tax for the same taxable year," see I.R.C. § 6212(c)(1) (1986),
and from instituting any proceedings to collect the deficiency until the period of limita-
tion ends or the tax court proceeding is final. See I.R.C. § 6213(a) (1986).
4. See Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 259-60 (1935); Welch v. Helvering, 290
U.S. 111, 115 (1933); Wickwire v. Reinecke, 275 U.S. 101, 105 (1927); United States v.
Rindskopf, 105 U.S. 418, 422 (1882); Bradford v. Commissioner, 796 F.2d 303, 305 (9th
Cir. 1986); Anastasato v. Commissioner, 794 F.2d 884, 887 (3d Cir. 1986); Carter v. Com-
missioner, 784 F.2d 1006, 1008 (9th Cir. 1986); Schaffer v. Commissioner, 779 F.2d 849,
857 (2d Cir. 1985); DiMauro v. United States, 706 F.2d 882, 884 (8th Cir. 1983); United
States v. Pomponio, 635 F.2d 293, 296 (4th Cir. 1980); Barnes v. Commissioner, 408 F.2d
65, 68 (7th Cir. 1969), cerL denied, 396 U.S. 836 (1969); Avery v. Commissioner, 22 F.2d
6, 8 (5th Cir. 1927); Jackson v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 394, 400 (1979); Hearings on Reve-
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lishing, prima facie, that the taxpayer owed the tax as assessed by the
Commissioner. To rebut this presumption and avoid a dismissal of the
action in the Commissioner's favor,6 the taxpayer must prove that the
deficiency determination has been issued arbitrarily7 or erroneously. 8
The presumption of correctness is an important procedural device9 for
the Commissioner because it places the burden of producing the evidence
nue Revision, 1925, Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 69th Cong., 1st Sess.
907-08 (1925) [hereinafter 1925 House Hearings] (statement of Mr. Ivins); 4 B. Bittker,
Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts 115.4, at 115-32 to 115-33 (1986); 9 J.
Mertens, The Law of Federal Income Taxation § 50.71, at 242 (1982); Dubroff & Gross-
man, The United States Tax Court: An Historical Analysis, 42 Alb. L. Rev. 191, 205(1978); Comment, Burden of Proof and Presumptions in the Tax Court in Net Worth
Cases Involving Civil Fraud, 42 Marquette L. Rev. 91, 92 (1958). But see infra note 53
and cases cited therein (Commissioner must earn presumption of correctness by present-
ing evidence linking taxpayer to income producing activity).
5. See United States v. Stonehill, 702 F.2d 1288, 1293 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1079 (1984); United States v. Pomponio, 635 F.2d 293, 296 (4th Cir. 1980);
Psaty v. United States, 442 F.2d 1154, 1159 (3d Cir. 1971). See generally C. McCormick,
Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 344, at 947-48 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984) (the party in
whose favor the presumption acts has established a prima facie case); 9 J. Wigmore,
Wigmore on Evidence § 2491, at 305 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1981) (presumption creates for
opponent a duty of producing evidence and if he does not, he loses as a matter of law).
Cf United States v. Rindskopf, 105 U.S. 418, 420 0882) (introduction of assessment into
evidence makes prima facie case in Commissioner's favor). Although Rindskopf predates
the ratification of the sixteenth amendment to the Constitution in 1913 permitting taxa-
tion of individuals based on income, it is cited in cases decided after the sixteenth amend-
ment. See, e.g., Williamsport Wire Rope Co. v. United States, 277 U.S. 551, 560 (1928);
Wickwire v. Reinecke, 275 U.S. 101, 105 (1927).
6. See I.R.C. § 7459(d) (1986), providing in pertinent part: "If a petition for a rede-
termination of a deficiency has been filed by the taxpayer, a decision of the Tax Court
dismissing the proceeding shall be considered as its decision that the deficiency is the
amount determined by the Secretary." See also 9 Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH), Rules of Practice
and Procedure of the United States Tax Court [hereinafter Tax Court Rule] 123,
5822N, at 66,172, and 149(b), I 5823H, at 66,212 (1984) (dismissal of proceeding or
failure to produce evidence when required to do so is considered as decision that Com-
missioner's deficiency determination is correct).
7. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 441 0976) (assessment is arbitrary when
taxpayer proves that it is "utterly without foundation").
8. See Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U.S. 507, 515-16 (1935); Bradford v. Commissioner,
796 F.2d 303, 305 (9th Cir. 1986); Anastasato v. Commissioner, 794 F.2d 884, 887 (3d
Cir. 1986); Doyal v. Commissioner, 616 F.2d 1191, 1192 (10th Cir. 1980); Carson v. United
States, 560 F.2d 693, 695-96 (5th Cir. 1977); Higginbotham v. United States, 556 F.2d
1173, 1175 (4th Cir. 1977); United States v. Rexach, 482 F.2d 10, 16 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1039 (1973); Note, Proving a Negative- When the Taxpayer Denies Receipt, 70
Cornell L. Rev. 141, 142-43 (1984) [hereinafter Note, Proving a Negative]; see generally C.
McCormick, supra note 5, § 344, at 952-56 (party opposing presumption must produce
evidence necessary to carry burden of production to avoid directed verdict); Wigmore,
supra note 5, § 2487, at 295-96 (same).
9. See Walker v. Commissioner, 757 F.2d 36, 37 (3d Cir. 1985) (recognizing pre-
sumption of correctness as an important tool for the recovery of taxes on unreported
income); see also Anastasato v. Commissioner, 794 F.2d 884, 886 (3d Cir. 1986) (recog-
nizing presumption as a procedural device); Higginbotham v. United States, 556 F.2d
1173, 1176 n.3 (4th Cir. 1977) (same); Barnes v. Commissioner, 408 F.2d 65, 68 (7th Cir.)
(same), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 836 (1969); Durovic v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1364, 1393
(1970) (same), aff'd in part, rev'd and remanded in part, 487 F.2d 36 (7th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 919 (1974).
PRESUMPTION OF CORRECTNESS
required to ascertain the correct tax liability"° on the taxpayer." Tradi-
10. See Ness, The Role of Statutory Presumptions in Determining Federal Tax Liabil-
ity, 12 Tax L. Rev. 321, 331 (1957) ("presumption is ... a formula for requiring the
taxpayer to present legally sufficient evidence negating the Commissioner's determina-
tion"); Sampanis, A View of the Evidentiary Prerequisites for the Presumption of Correct-
ness in Tax Deficiency Cases, 8 Rev. Tax. Ind. 49, 52 (1984) (presumption is procedural
and places overall burden of proving inaccuracy of Commissioner's determination on
taxpayer); Note, Federal Income Taxation: Deficiency Assessments in Unreported Income
Cases, 49 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 641, 644 (1980) [hereinafter Note, Deficiency Assessments]
("one of the primary goals of the presumption of correctness is to assure that the taxpayer
comes forward and reveals all the evidence in his possession"); Note, Proving a Negative,
supra note 8, at 144 (presumption requires taxpayer to reveal evidence in his possession);
see also Carson v. Commissioner, 560 F.2d 693, 695-96 (5th Cir. 1977) ("The burden [of
proof] and the presumption [of correctness] ... are for the most part but the opposite sides
of a single coin ... .") (emphasis in original); C. McCormick, supra note 5, § 344, at 973-
74 (must produce evidence to avoid directed verdict); Wigmore, supra note 5, § 2487, at
295 (same); Bohlen, The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law Upon the Burden of
Proof, 68 U. Pa. L. Rev. 307, 319-20 (1920) (presumption functions to require opposing
party to produce a quantity and quality of evidence necessary to rebut it).
The burden of proof encompasses two different concepts: the burden of production and
the burden of persuasion. See Schaffer v. Commissioner, 779 F.2d 849, 857 (2d Cir.
1985); Note, Proving a Negative, supra note 8, at 142 n.9. But see L. Casey, Federal Tax
Practice § 7.7, at 60-61 (1981) (burden of proof is a burden of persuasion, it is to be
distinguished from going forward with the evidence).
The burden of production places a duty on a party to come forward with evidence
sufficient to satisfy a reasonable man that the existence of an alleged fact is more likely
than not. See C. McCormick, supra note 5, § 344, at 973-74; Wigmore, supra note 5,
§ 2487, at 294-95. If this burden is not met, the court will decide in favor of the opposing
party on the particular factual issue. See C. McCormick, supra note 5, § 344, at 973-74;
Wigmore, supra note 5, § 2487, at 295. Thus, in a case involving unreported income, the
taxpayer carries his burden of production by showing that the deficiency notice is errone-
ous or arbitrarily assessed. See Llorente v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 260, 264 (1980), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 649 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1981); Schwerdtfeger, The Burden of Proof in
the Tax Court, 42 Ky. L.J. 147, 150 (1954).
The burden of persuasion is the burden of convincing the trier of fact that the alleged
fact is true. See C. McCormick, supra note 5, § 336, at 947; Wigmore, supra note 5,
§ 2486, at 287; Dubroff & Grossman, supra note 4, at 205; Piper & Jerge, Shifting the
Burden of Proof in Tax Court, 31 Taxes 303, 304 (1978); Comment, supra note 4, at 91-
92. In an unreported income case, the taxpayer must persuade the court that he did not
receive the income based on all the evidence presented at trial. See Goldberg v. United
States, 789 F.2d 1341, 1343 (9th Cir. 1986); Brewster v. Commissioner, 607 F.2d 1369,
1375 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 991 (1979); Higginbotham v. United States, 556
F.2d 1173, 1176 (4th Cir. 1977); see also Llorente v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 260, 272-73
(1980) (Tanmenwald, J., concurring) (expressing dissatisfaction with distinction between
burdens because many courts confuse the two concepts), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 649
F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1981).
11. The Tax Court places the burden of proving the incorrectness of the determina-
tion on the taxpayer. See Tax Court Rule 142(a), supra note 13, 5823A, at 66,178.
Section 7453 of the Code allows the Tax Court to prescribe its own rules of practice and
procedure. See I.R.C. § 7453 (1986).
Courts and commentators have recognized that the burden of proof is upon the tax-
payer. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 440 (1976); Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U.S.
507, 515 (1935); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933); Anastasato v. Commis-
sioner, 794 F.2d 884, 887 (3d Cir. 1986); Estate of Todisco v. Commissioner, 757 F.2d 1,
6 (1st Cir. 1985); Carson v. United States, 560 F.2d 693, 695-96 (5th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Rexach, 482 F.2d 10, 16 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1039 (1973); Barnes v.
Commissioner, 408 F.2d 65, 68 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 836 (1969); L
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tionally, courts have denied taxpayer motions to shift this burden of
proof to the Commissioner. 12 Recently, however, some courts have re-
quired the Commissioner to put forth substantial evidence indicating the
basis for and accuracy of the assessment to earn the presumption of cor-
rectness 3 when this assessment is based on the alleged existence of unre-
ported income. 14 These courts seek to relieve the taxpayer of the burden
of proving the non-existence of income."S They require that the Commis-
sioner prove that the deficiency notice is based on a "rational founda-
tion" before he will be granted the presumption of correctness.' 6 Such a
shift, however, ignores the procedural and policy reasons for originally
Casey, supra note 10, § 7.4, at 33-34; M. Garbis, supra note 2, 1 12.01; Mertens, supra
note 4, § 50.61, at 194; Copelon, Practical Problems on Burden of Proof in Civil Trials, 10
N.Y.U. Inst. on Fed. Tax'n 865, 865 (1951); Dubroff & Grossman, supra note 4, at 205-
10.
12. See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
13. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
14. This Note is concerned with unreported income and whether taxpayers assessed
with tax on this income are entitled to different procedural rules than taxpayers assessed
with tax on undeclared income or improper deductions. Seeinfra Part I. B.
Unreported income is income that is taxable but has not been reported on the tax-
payer's return. See H. Balter, Tax Fraud and Evasion 1 1.02[1], at 1-6 (1983); M. Garbis,
supra note 2, 1 3.02[l], at 3-5; Note, Proving a Negative, supra note 8, at 141.
In unreported income cases, courts seek to determine whether the taxpayer has re-
ceived the income. See, e.g., Weimerskirch v. Commissioner, 596 F.2d 358, 361 (9th Cir.
1979) (whether taxpayer received income from sale of narcotics); Gerardo v. Commis-
sioner, 552 F.2d 549, 553 (3d Cir. 1977) (whether taxpayer received income from gam-
bling operation); Dellacroce v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 269, 276 (1984) (whether taxpayer
received racketeering payoff); Llorente v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 260, 263-64 (1980)
(whether taxpayer received income from the sale of illegal drugs), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 649 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1981). When the IRS audits an individual, its position is that
the taxpayer has received income from these activities that is taxable. See Llorente v.
Commissioner, 74 T.C. 260, 263 (1980), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 649 F.2d 152 (2d Cir.
1981); Giddio v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1530, 1532 (1970). The taxpayer argues that he
has not received the alleged income and challenges the Commissioner to prove that he
did. See Llorente v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 260, 263 (1980), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
649 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1981); Jackson v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 394, 399 (1979); Giddio v.
Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1530, 1532 (1969).
Unreported income differs from undeclared income because undeclared income is ac-
knowledged by the taxpayer and the dispute is whether the income is recognizable and
taxable, for example, a gift or the return of capital. See Note, Proving a Negative, supra
note 8, at 141.
Unreported income also differs from erroneous deductions because, in the latter, the
taxpayer is asserting that he is entitled to reduce his tax liability. See H. Baiter, supra
note 14, 1.02[1][a], at 1-13; M. Saltzman, supra note 1, 5.07[4][b], at 5-53;
Schwerdtfeger, supra note 10, at 153-54; Note, Proving a Negative, supra note 8, at 141.
15. See Schaffer v. Commissioner, 779 F.2d 849, 858 (2d Cir. 1985); Karme v. Com-
missioner, 673 F.2d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 1982); Llorente v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d 152,
156 (2d Cir. 1981); Rockwell v. Commissioner, 512 F.2d 882, 886 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1015 (1975); see also infra note 54 and accompanying text (discussing negative
taxpayer must prove).
16. See Bradford v. Commissioner, 796 F.2d 303, 305 (9th Cir. 1986); Anastasato v.
Commissioner, 794 F.2d 884, 887 (3d Cir. 1986); Schaffer v. Commissioner, 779 F.2d 849,
858 (2d Cir. 1985); Walker v. Commissioner, 757 F.2d 36, 38 (3d Cir. 1985); Spatafore v.
United States, 752 F.2d 415, 418 (9th Cir. 1985); Adamson v. Commissioner, 745 F.2d
541, 547 (9th Cir. 1984); DiMauro v. United States, 706 F.2d 882, 884 (8th Cir. 1983);
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granting the Commissioner the presumption of correctness. 7
This Note addresses the question whether the Commissioner should be
required to present evidence to obtain the presumption of correctness in
unreported income cases. Part I discusses the administration of the In-
ternal Revenue Code (Code), reviews the objectives and methods of an
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) examination, and also outlines the opera-
tion of the presumption of correctness. Part II argues that the presump-
tion of correctness is necessary to implement tax policy and that when
proper administrative procedures are followed, they are effective to safe-
guard the taxpayer's rights. This Note concludes that unless the taxpayer
can demonstrate that the Commissioner failed to follow administrative
procedures or base the deficiency assessment on an established fact, the
Comissioner should be granted the presumption of correctness.
I. THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE AND
THE PRESUMPTION OF CORRECTNESS
A. The Objectives and Methods of the IRS Examination
The federal system of taxation depends on each taxpayer's voluntary
compliance with the tax laws because the individual taxpayer is responsi-
ble for determining his tax liability. 8 To deter attempted tax evasion,
persons found guilty of non-compliance with the tax laws 9 may be pun-
ished with criminal2° and civil2 sanctions. The IRS determines whether
Edwards v. Commissioner, 680 F.2d 1268, 1270 (9th Cir. 1982); Karme v. Commissioner,
673 F.2d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 1982).
17. See Llorente v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 260, 271-72 (1980) (Fay, J., concurring),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 649 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1981).
18. See United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 145 0975); Spies v. United States,
317 U.S. 492, 495 (1943); Breland v. United States, 323 F.2d 492, 496 (5th Cir. 1963); H.
Baiter, supra note 14, 1.01, at 1-1; R. Fink, supra note 2, § 1.01, at 1-2; M. Garbis,
supra note 2, 1.01, at 1-2; W. Williams, Strengthening IRS Examination and Collection
Processes by Administrative Changes in Staffing, Training Deployment, and Technology,
1983 A.B.A. Sec. Tax'n, Income Tax Compliance Rep. 235.
19. See United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 145 (1975) (Congress established
statutes to enable the IRS to investigate taxpayers' returns to insure compliance); Spies v.
United States, 317 U.S. 492, 495 (1943) ("Congress has imposed a variety of sanctions for
the protection of the system and the revenues."); H. Baiter, supra note 14, C 11.01, at 11-2
(to aid Commissioner to enforce the tax statutes, "Congress has imposed penalties which
embrace both criminal and civil sanctions"); R. Fink, supra note 2, § 15.01, at 15-1 to 15-
2 (same); M. Saltzman, supra note 1, 7.01, at 7-3 (same).
20. See I.R.C. § 7201 (1986) (attempt to evade or defeat taxes imposed by Code is
punishable as a felony); I.R.C. § 7202 (1986) (willful failure to collect or pay tax is pun-
ishable as a felony). Other Code sections that impose criminal sanctions are: I.R.C.§§ 7203-16, 7231-32; see also J. Henry, Noncompliance with U.S. Tax Law-Evidence on
Size, Growth, and Composition, 1983 A.B.A. Sec. Tax'n, Income Tax Compliance Rep.
15, 26 & n.31 ("One recent count found nineteen major criminal provisions in the Inter-
nal Revenue Code and twenty-nine related ones in the U.S. Criminal Code."). See gener-
ally H. Baiter, supra note 14, 11.01-11.06, at 11-2 to 11-59 (discussing criminal
sanctions); R. Fink, supra note 2, §§ 16.01-16.10, at 16-1 to 16-29 (same); N. Saltzman,
supra note 1, 7.02-7.07, at 7-4 to 7-49 (same).
21. See I.R.C. §§ 6651-59, 6671-99 (1986). Although I.R.C. §§ 6651-59 are entitled
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these sanctions will apply after an examination of selected individuals'
tax returns.2
The IRS determines which returns are examined through a variety of
screening procedures that evaluate the likelihood of non-compliance and
the necessity of further investigation. When a tax return is received it is
initially checked for form, execution, and mathematical accuracy.23 Af-
ter these preliminary procedures, information on the return is computer
examined by the Discriminant Function (DIF) System using mathemati-
cal formulas to isolate returns that are most likely to contain errors.24
Additionally, the IRS attempts to discover nonreporting of income by
matching individuals' returns with information received from independ-
ent sources such as partnership, fiduciary and withholding tax returns.2 5
Suspected criminal violation of tax laws such as tax evasion is investi-
gated through the Criminal Investigation Division (CID).26
"additions to the tax," these additions are recognized as penal in nature. See Commis-
sioner v. Acker, 361 U.S. 87, 91 & n.4 (1959), (imposing a 10% addition to the tax for
failure to file a declaration of estimated tax is penal in nature); see also H. Balter, supra
note 14, 11 8.01-8.03, at 8-2 to 8-110 (discussing civil sanctions); R. Fink, supra note 2,
§§ 15.01-15.06, at 15-1 to 15-43 (same); M. Saltzman, supra note 1, 11 7.08-7.11, at 7-49
to 7-86 (same).
22. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. In addition, the IRS established the
Criminal Investigation Division (CID) to investigate suspected violations of tax laws with
the objective of deterring non-compliance by threatening sanctions. See Administrative
Manual, supra note 2, P-9-1, at 1305-57 (1986); R. Fink, supra note 2, § 5.02, at 5-14; M.
Saltzman, supra note 1, 1 12.01, at 12-1.
23. See 3 Fed. Tax Regs. § 601.105(a) (1986) (statement of procedural rules); B. Bitt-
ker, supra note 4, I 112.1.1, at 112-2; A. Santa Barbara, supra note 2, at 273-74. A
correction notice is sent to the taxpayer if there is a mathematical or clerical error. See B.
Bittker, supra note 4, 1 112.1.1, at 112-2; A. Santa Barbara, supra note 2, at 274. A
mathematical or clerical error is defined in section 6213 (g)(2) of the Code as miscalcula-
tions, incorrect use of tax tables, inconsistencies within the tax return, or exceeding de-
duction or credit limits. This correction notice is not considered a deficiency notice for
the purposes of petitioning the Tax Court. See I.R.C. § 6213(b)(1) (1986). The IRC
permits the taxpayer to request an abatement of the assessment and the Commissioner
must comply. See I.R.C. § 6213(b)(2)(A) (1986). Any reassessment of the tax with
respect to the abatement is subject to the ordinary deficiency procedures. Id. At this
stage, the returns also are checked for clearly unallowable items. See Audit Manual,
supra note 2, 4(13)21, at 8963-49 (listing unallowable items). Examples of such items are
deductions for a loss on the sale of a residence and the cost of maternity clothes. Id.
Because this is a proposed adjustment similar to that after an audit, the taxpayer may
reject it and force the IRS to follow normal audit and deficiency procedures. See B.
Bittker, supra note 4, % 112.1.1, at 112-2; M. Saltzman, supra note 1, 1 8.04[2], at 8-18; A.
Santa Barbara, supra note 2, at 274.
24. See Audit Manual, supra note 2, 4116, at 7105-3 to 7105-4; B. Bittker, supra note
4, 1 112.1.1, at 112-2; M. Saltzman, supra note 1, 1 8.03[l][a], at 8-7 to 8-8. In 1975, DIF
examinations accounted for approximately 75% of returns selected for audit. See M.
Saltzman, supra note 1, 1 8.03[1][a], at 8-7 n.4 (citing U.S. Comptroller General, Report
to the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, How the Internal Revenue Service
Selects Individual Income Tax Returns for Audit 12 (GGD-76-55, 1976)).
25. See B. Bittker, supra note 4, 1 112.1.1, at 112-3; M. Saltzman, supra note 1,
8.03[1][a], at 8-7 to 8-8; A. Santa Barbara, supra note 2, at 276-77.
26. See Administrative Manual, supra note 2, P-9-1, at 1305-57; R. Fink, supra note
2, § 5.02, at 5-14; M. Saltzman, supra note 1, 1 12.01, at 12-2. The CID has adopted
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When an individual's tax return is selected for review, the IRS exami-
nation focuses on the issues raised during the screening process. The IRS
performs several types of tax audits. The first are correspondence exami-
nations that are performed mainly in conjunction with the unallowable
items and DIF programs.27 The second type of examination occurs in
the district office and essentially involves an interview with the taxpayer
and a review of certain records in support of specific items in the re-
turn.2 8 The third type of examination are field examinations; these in-
volve complex tax issues and require revenue agents, with advanced
accounting and tax knowledge, to visit the taxpayer's place of business to
examine the books and records that substantiate his tax return.29 Based
on the findings of this examination,30 a report is prepared by an IRS
agent 31 indicating whether a deficiency exists.32 If the taxpayer disputes
programs to enforce the Code. See Administrative Manual, supra note 2, P-9-18, at 1305-
57. The first is the "Taxpayers in General" program that involves all types of taxes and
taxpayers in as many income brackets, occupations and businesses, and geographic areas
as possible. See R. Fink, supra note 2, § 5.04, at 5-19; M. Saltzman, supra note 1, ,
12.02[2], at 12-5 to 12-6. The second is the "Special Enforcement Program," which iden-
tifies those taxpayers who derive substantial income from illegal activities, including ma-
jor racketeers and those with income from illegal sources or corrupt practice. See R.
Fink, supra note 2, § 5.04, at 5-19 to 5-21; M. Saltzman, supra note 1, 12.02[2], at 12-5
to 12-6. The CID receives data from several sources: referrals by other IRS departments,
see R. Fink, supra note 2, § 5.03, at 5-15; M. Saltzman, supra note 1, 12.03[l](1), at 12-
8; investigative gathering activities of special agents, see R. Fink, supra note 2, § 5.02, at
5-14; M. Saltzman, supra note 1, 12.0311](2), at 12-9 to 12-10; and information pro-
vided by the public, governmental agencies, and reported currency transactions. See R.
Fink, supra note 2, § 5.03, at 5-15 to 5-19; M. Saltzman, supra note 1, 12.0311](3), at 12-
9 to 12-12.
The information for deficiency notices involving unreported income often is generated
by CID investigations. See M. Saltzman, supra note 1, 12.01, at 12-2 to 12-3.
27. See M. Saltzman, supra note 1, 8.04[4], at 8-19; B. Bittker, supra note 4, f
112.1.2, at 112-6. This examination is performed by asking the taxpayer "to produce
receipts, cancelled checks, and the like to support an item of income, deduction, or credit
on the tax return." M. Saltzman, supra note 1, 8.04[4], at 8-19.
28. See B. Bittker, supra note 4, 112.1.2, at 112-6; M. Saltzman, supra note 1, f
8.04[4], at 8-19.
29. See B. Bittker, supra note 4, 112.1.2, at 112-6 to 12-7; R. Fink, supra note 2, §
1.03[3], at 1-3; M. Saltzman, supra note 1, 8.06, at 8-23; A. Santa Barbara, supra note 2,
at 280-81.
There are also CID examinations that enforce the "taxpayer in general" and "special
enforcement" programs. See supra note 26.
30. An IRS agent reaches a finding that the taxpayer received income only after con-
sidering the facts before him. See Rev. Proc. 64-22, 1964-1 C.B. 689 (IRS agents in-
structed that Code should not be strained to protect revenues and that issues should be
raised only when they have "merit, [and] never arbitrarily or for trading purposes"); see
also Audit Manual, supra note 2, 120, at 7239-9 (construction of Code should be in fair
and impartial manner); cf. United States v. Rindskopf, 105 U.S. 418, 420 (1882) (When
the Commissioner made the determination "'he had before him proofs which were suffi-
cient to satisfy a just and fair-minded person that such assessment ought to be made.' ")
(quoting trial judge's charge to the jury).
31. The report prepared is the Revenue Agent's Report (RAR), which presents the
facts found during the audit and the basis for the deficiency. See M. Saltzman, supra note
1, i 8.06[8], at 8-65 to 8-67; A. Santa Barbara, supra note 2, at 291-92. The purpose of
the RAR is to communicate the agent's findings during the audit to the taxpayer. See
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the agent's findings,33 he is given the opportunity to have the deficiency
determination reviewed by the IRS Appeals Office, which independently
determines whether the deficiency notice was warranted based on avail-
able facts.3 4 When the dispute cannot be resolved at the appellate level
or when the taxpayer refuses appellate review, the Commissioner issues a
deficiency notice."
A deficiency notice is an assessment authorized by statute for the un-
paid portion of an individual's tax liability.36 When the taxpayer receives
a deficiency notice he has four options: pay the assessed tax and sue the
United States for a refund in a federal district court;3 7 pay the assessed
tax and sue for a refund in the Court of Claims; 38 petition the Tax Court
for a redetermination of the assessment without first paying the assessed
tax; 39 or do nothing and wait for the Commissioner to levy on his
assets. 4o
Audit Manual, supra note 2, at 4231-15. Before this report is sent to the taxpayer, it may
be technically and procedurally reviewed. See M. Saltzman, supra note 1, 8.08[3], at
8-76 to 8-77. The "[pirocedural review is essentially a clerical review ensuring ... that
the case file is complete and properly assembled .... The technical review is geared to
ensuring that all the relevant facts have been developed and that the findings are ade-
quately supported by the law and the facts." Id. at 8-69.
32. A deficiency exists when the amount of tax imposed by the statute exceeds the
amount of tax shown on the taxpayer's return, if any, plus amounts previously assessed or
collected, reduced by rebates, which include abatements, credits, refunds or repayments.
See I.R.C. § 6211(a) (1986).
33. The IRS informs the taxpayer of the reasons for the deficiency and apprises the
taxpayer of his procedural rights in what is called the "thirty-day letter." See 3 Fed. Tax.
Regs. § 601.105(d); B. Bittker, supra note 4, V 112.1.2, at 112-7. The "thirty-day letter
does not constitute a notice of deficiency. Rather, it is an indication of what the [IRS]
proposes to do." A. Santa Barbara, supra note 2, at 295.
34. See B. Bittker, supra note 4, T 112.1.4, at 112-10; R. Fink, supra note 2, § 2.01, at
2-2; M. Saltzman, supra note 1, 1 8.01, at 8-3. The IRS seeks "resolution of tax disputes
[through] appeal rather than court litigation, to minimize expenditures of time and
money by the government and the taxpayer." M. Saltzman, supra note 1, 1 9.01, at 9-2.
35. See B. Bittker, supra note 4, 1 112.1.6, at 112-21; M. Saltzman, supra note 1, 1
8.08, at 8-70; see also supra note 8 (Commissioner authorized to send notice of
deficiency).
36. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
37. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (1982); B. Bittker, supra note 4, 1 115.7, at 115-36; M.
Saltzman, supra note 1, % 1.03[2][a](1), at 1-25 to 1-26; A. Santa Barbara, supra note 2, at
377.
38. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1982); B. Bittker, supra note 4, 1 115.7, at 115-36; M.
Saltzman, supra note 1, 1 1.03[2][a](1), at 1-25 to 1-26; A. Santa Barbara, supra note 2, at
370-76.
39. See B. Bittker, supra note 4, 115.1, at 115-2; M. Saltzman, supra note 1,
1.03[2](2), at 1-26; A. Santa Barbara, supra note 2, at 366-67; see also I.R.C. § 7442
(1986) (granting tax court jurisdiction).
The Tax Court has jurisdiction to redetermine a taxpayer's deficiency when the IRS
determines a deficiency, the taxpayer has been notified of the deficiency determination,
and the taxpayer files a petition with the Tax Court within the prescribed period of time
for redetermination of the deficiency. See B. Bittker, supra note 4, 1115.2.2, at 115-10; A.
Santa Barbara, supra note 2, at 360-68.
40. See I.R.C. § 6213 (1986).
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B. The Presumption of Correctness
If the taxpayer exercises his right to petition the Tax Court" for a
redetermination of the deficiency,42 he is confronted with a presumption
of correctness that attaches to the deficiency notice upon the presentation
of the notice to the court.43 This presumption of correctness allows the
Commissioner to make a prima facie showing' that the taxpayer owes
the tax as determined. The taxpayer then has the burden of rebutting
this presumption by demonstrating the assessment's inaccuracy4 5 by a
preponderance of the evidence.'
In a tax court proceeding, if a taxpayer alleges that an assessment
based on unreported income has been formulated in an arbitrary manner
and thereafter moves to shift the burden of proof to the Commissioner,
the tax court and some circuit courts reject the attempt unless there is
proof of arbitrariness.47 These courts require the taxpayer to come forth
with sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of correctness,4" in or-
der to reach the underlying issue whether the taxpayer owes the assessed
tax.' The fear is that to hold otherwise would create a bifurcated pro-
ceeding-one, to consider whether the deficiency notice was arbitrarily
41. This Note presumes that the taxpayer petitions the tax court. It should be noted
that regardless of which forum the taxpayer chooses, the burden of proof remains the
same. There are, however, tactical choices available to the taxpayer as to which court to
petition; the taxpayer's considerations include paying the assessed tax and avoiding the
possible accumulation of interest, the availability of a jury in the district court, the juris-
diction's view on the issue in question, the court's expertise, and the discovery procedures
available. See Whitfield & McCallum, Burden of Proof and Choice of Forum in Tax
Litigation, 20 Vand. L. Rev. 1179, 1179-81 (1967); see also Crampton, Forum Shopping,
31 Tax Lawyer 321, 321-28 (1978) (analyzing considerations of forum shopping for set-
tling tax disputes); supra notes 37-39 and the accompanying text (discussing taxpayer's
options on which court to file suit).
42. See supra notes 39 & 41 and accompanying text.
43. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
44. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
45. See Bradford v. Commissioner, 796 F.2d 303, 305 (9th Cir. 1986); Schaffer v.
Commissioner, 779 F.2d 849, 858 (2d Cir. 1985).
46. See Estate of Whitt v. Commissioner, 751 F.2d 1548, 1556 (11th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 106 S. Ct. 523 (1985); Brewster v. Commissioner, 607 F.2d 1369, 1374-75 (D.C.
Cir.), cert denied, 444 U.S. 991 (1979); Carson v. United States, 560 F.2d 693, 695-96
(5th Cir. 1977); Higginbotham v. United States, 556 F.2d 1173, 1176 (4th Cir. 1977);
Mertens, supra note 4, § 50.62, at 214; Comment, supra note 4, at 92-93.
47. See United States v. Pomponio, 635 F.2d 293, 297 n.4 (4th Cir. 1980); Avery v.
Commissioner, 574 F.2d 467, 468 (9th Cir. 1978); Cannon v. Commissioner, 533 F.2d
959, 961 (5th Cir. 1976); Conforte v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1160, 1175 (1980); Llorente
v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 260, 277 (1980) (Tannenwald, J., concurring), aff'd in part.
rev'd in part, 649 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1981); see also United States v. Rexach, 482 F.2d 10,
16 (1st Cir.) (burden of proof remains on the taxpayer at all times), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1039 (1973); Harbin v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 373, 376 (1963) (taxpayer must first prove
the deficiency notice arbitrary before the burden of production shifts); Schwerdtfeger,
supra note 10, at 158 (taxpayer must prove deficiency notice wrong before presumption of
correctness shifts).
48. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
49. See Llorente v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 260, 271 (1980) (Fay, J., concurring),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 649 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1981); see also supra note 18 and accom-
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assessed and a second to consider the underlying issue of tax liability.50
If the taxpayer produces sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the
deficiency notice either is erroneous or arbitrary,51 the burden of produc-
tion shifts to the Commissioner, who then has the opportunity to pro-
duce evidence tending to show that the taxpayer has not satisfied his tax
liability. 52
panying text (presumption forces taxpayer to reveal the evidence required to determine
the correctness of his tax liability).
50. See Llorente v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 260, 271 (1980) (Fay, J., concurring), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 649 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1981); Sampanis, supra note 18, at 64; Note,
Deficiency Assessments, supra note 10, at 652 n.72.
51. See, e.g., Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U.S. 507, 510-11 (1935) (Commissioner's ap-
portionment of cost of stock proved arbitrary by the taxpayer); United States v. Besase,
623 F.2d 463, 466 (6th Cir.) (several taxpayers rebutted presumption with credible and
reasonable testimony), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1062 (1980); Loftin & Woodward, Inc. v.
United States, 577 F.2d 1206, 1228 (5th Cir. 1978) (taxpayer overcame presumption by
showing Commissioner used the wrong method in calculating his tax); Demkowicz v.
Commissioner, 551 F.2d 929, 931-32 (3d Cir. 1977) (same).
Once the taxpayer succeeds in rebutting the presumption, it has no further effect and is
said to disappear from the case. See Anastasato v. Commissioner, 794 F.2d 884, 887 (3d
Cir. 1986); Adamson v. Commissioner, 745 F.2d 541, 547 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Stonehill, 702 F.2d 1288, 1294 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1079 (1984);
Silverman v. Commissioner, 538 F.2d 927, 930-31 (2d Cir. 1976); Sharwell v. Commis-
sioner, 419 F.2d 1057, 1060 (6th Cir. 1969); Mertens, supra note 4, § 50.71, at 242;
Dubroff & Grossman, supra note 4, at 205; Comment, supra note 4, at 92; see also Alpine
Forwarding Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 60 F.2d 734, 736 (2d Cir. 1932) (Learned
Hand, J.) ("If the trial is properly conducted, the presumption will not be mentioned at
all . . . ."); Copelon, supra note 5, at 868 (once the taxpayer rebuts the presumption, the
tax court must decide case on the evidence); see generally Wigmore, supra note 5, § 2491,
at 305 (if evidence to the contrary is offered, presumption disappears).
52. See Doyal v. Commissioner, 616 F.2d 1191, 1192 (10th Cir. 1980); Carson v. United
States, 560 F.2d 693, 696 (5th Cir. 1977); Higginbotham v. United States, 556 F.2d 1173,
1175 (4th Cir. 1977); Baird v. Commissioner, 438 F.2d 490, 494-95 (3d Cir. 1970); see
generally Wigmore, supra note 5, § 2487, at 294-96 (once party rebuts presumption, bur-
den of production shifts to opposing party).
Courts are in dispute on whether the ultimate burden of persuasion also shifts to the
Commissioner. A minority of courts maintain that the burden of persuasion shifts to the
Commissioner in unreported income cases. See Keogh v. Commissioner, 713 F.2d 496,
501 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Stonehill, 702 F.2d 1288, 1294 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1079 (1984); see also supra note 10 (discussing distinction between bur-
den of production and burden of persuasion). This view has been criticized as contrary to
the express language of the Tax Court's rule placing the burden of proof on the taxpayer.
See Dubroff & Grossman, supra note 4, at 206-07.
The majority view holds that the ultimate burden of persuasion remains on the tax-
payer throughout the case. See Anastasato v. Commissioner, 794 F.2d 884, 887 (3d Cir.
1986); United States v. Rexach, 482 F.2d 10, 16 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1039
(1973); Mertens, supra note 4, § 50.71, at 242; Comment, Burden of Proof in Tax Litiga-
tion: Offset and Equitable Recoupment, 15 Buffalo L. Rev. 616, 616 (1966).
Although the determination of which party should have the ultimate burden of persua-
sion is not dispositive of the outcome in the majority of cases, it is of fundamental signifi-
cance when access to information is difficult and events have become remote. See United
States v. Rexach, 482 F.2d 10, 15 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1039 (1973); see also
Llorente v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 260, 273 n.2 (1980) (Tannenwald, J., concurring) (al-
location of burden of proof can be deciding factor in outcome of some cases), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 649 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1981).
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Recently, however, some circuit courts of appeals have held that in
unreported income cases the Commissioner is required to earn the pre-
sumption of correctness by presenting evidence linking the taxpayer to
the income producing activity.53 These courts take the position that the
initial burden of production is best placed on the Commissioner because,
otherwise, the taxpayer is placed in the difficult position of proving the
non-existence of unreported income.54
53. See Bradford v. Commissioner, 796 F.2d 303, 305 (9th Cir. 1986) (Before the
government is granted the presumption of correctness, it must produce "'some substan-
tial evidence... demonstrating that the taxpayer received unreported income.'" (quoting
Delaney v. Commissioner, 743 F.2d 670, 671 (9th Cir. 1984))); Anastasato v. Commis-
sioner, 794 F.2d 884, 887 (3d Cir. 1986) (Commissioner not granted presumption of cor-
rectness until he links the taxpayer to income producing activity); Schaffer v.
Commissioner, 779 F.2d 849, 858 (2d Cir. 1985) (Commissioner initially must present
evidence to be afforded the presumption of correctness); Walker v. Commissioner, 757
F.2d 36, 38 (3d Cir. 1985) (Commissioner must provide evidence supporting inference
that taxpayer involved in income producing activity even when taxpayer does not pro-
duce any evidence); Spatafore v. United States, 752 F.2d 415, 418 (9th Cir. 1985) ("In a
tax deficiency suit the Government has the initial burden of offering some substantive
evidence showing that the taxpayer received income from the charged activity.");
DiMauro v. United States, 706 F.2d 882, 884 (8th Cir. 1983) (Commissioner not granted
presumption of correctness until he connects taxpayer with income producing activity).
But see Keogh v. Commissioner, 713 F.2d 496, 501 (9th Cir. 1983) (in unreported income
cases, the Commissioner's determination is presumptively correct and, therefore, the tax-
payer has the initial burden of production); Llorente v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 260, 271
(1980) (Fay, J., concurring) (taxpayer should not be permitted to shift burden of proof
until he makes prima facie case), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 649 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1981).
54. The negative the taxpayer must prove is that he did not receive income. The
problems of proof necessary to establish non-receipt of income have prompted some
courts to shift the burden to the Commissioner. See Schaffer v. Commissioner, 779 F.2d
849, 858 (2d Cir. 1985) (noting that placing burden of proving non-receipt of illegal in-
come on taxpayer is "unfair" and sometimes "impossible" (quoting Llorente v. Commis-
sioner, 649 F.2d 152, 156 (2d Cir. 1981))); Karme v. Commissioner, 673 F.2d 1062, 1065
(9th Cir. 1982) (" '[T]he taxpayer may face practical difficulties in attempting to refute the
Commissioner's assertion that the taxpayer received unreported income."' (quoting
Rockwell v. Commissioner, 512 F.2d 882, 886 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1015
(1975))); see also Note, Proving a Negative, supra note 8, at 153 (taxpayer faces inherent
difficulties when required to prove a negative); Wall Street J., Mar. 4, 1987, at 1, col. 5
(proposals introduced in Senate to switch burden of proof to Commissioner). But see
Saunders, The Mythic Difficulty in Proving a Negative, 15 Seton Hall L. Rev. 276, 277
(1985) (no inherent difficulty in proving a negative proposition); see also W. Best, A Trea-
tise on the Principles of Evidence § 255 (London 1849) ("[P]roof of a negative may often
very reasonably be required when the qualifying circumstances are the direct matters in
issue .. "); C. McCormick, supra note 5, § 337 n.15 (rule relieving burden of proof from
party who has to prove a negative is erroneous); P. Taylor, A Treatise on the Law of
Evidence § 364, at 341 (1887) (allocation of burden of proof to party asserting affirmative
adopted as rule of convenience and not because it is impossible to prove a negative);
Wigmore, supra note 5, § 2486, at 288 (party with affirmative assertion does not deter-
mine which party has burden of proof nor is it of significant circumstance; the burden is
often on a party who has to prove a negative).
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II. THE PRESUMPTION OF CORRECTNESS-FUNCTIONS, BENEFITS,
AND JUSTIFICATIONS
A. Judicial Deference to Administrative Rulemaking Authority
The Supreme Court has held that when Congress grants an agency
broad authority to prescribe rules and procedures, these rules should re-
ceive deferential treatment from reviewing courts." The Revenue Act of
1924 empowered the Board of Tax Appeals to formulate its own rules of
evidence and procedure. 56 Pursuant to this authority, the Board deter-
mined that placing the burden of proving the inaccuracy of a governmen-
tal assessment of an unfulfilled tax liability on the taxpayer was necessary
for even minimal enforcement of the Code.57 This decision was criticized
during hearings on the 1926 Revenue Act.5" Although the Senate con-
55. See Commissioner v. Portland Cement Co., 450 U.S. 156, 169 (1981). The Court
stated that:
These regulations command our respect, for Congress has delegated to the Sec-
retary of the Treasury, not to this Court, the task 'of administering the tax laws
of the Nation.' We therefore must defer to [Treasury Regulations] that 'imple-
ment the congressional mandate in some reasonable manner.' To put the same
principle conversely, [Treasury Regulations] 'must be sustained unless unrea-
sonable and plainly inconsistent with the revenue statutes.'
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 550 (1973);
United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 307 (1967); Commissioner v. South Texas Lum-
ber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 (1948)).
56. "The proceedings of the Board ... shall be conducted in accordance with such
rules of evidence and procedure as the Board may prescribe." Revenue Act of 1924, ch.
234, § 900(h), 43 Stat. 337.
The Board of Tax Appeals was established as "an independent agency in the executive
branch of the Government." Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, §§ 900(a), (k), 43 Stat. 336,
338. In 1942, the name of the Board was changed to "The Tax Court of the United
States," see Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 504, 56 Stat. 798, 957, but the status of the
court, an agency of the executive branch, was not changed. See Dubroff, The United
States Tax Court: An Historical Analysis 165 (1979). Although in 1969 the court was
established as a legislative court under Article I of the Constitution, and its name was
changed to the "United States Tax Court," see Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-
172, § 951, 83 Stat. 487, 730 amending I.R.C. § 7441 (1954), the status of the court did
not change. See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 961, 83 Stat. 487, 734.
57. During hearings on the 1926 Revenue Act, a former member of the Board of Tax
Appeals testified that if the burden of proof were to be placed on the Commissioner
instead of the taxpayer, Congress "might as well repeal the income tax law and pass the
hat, because you will practically be saying to the taxpayer, 'How much do you want to
contribute toward the support of the Government?' and in that case they would have to
decide for themselves." 1925 House Hearings, supra note 4, at 907 (statement of Mr. J.
Ivins). He further stated that the Board decided to place the burden of proof upon the
taxpayer because the taxpayer was the moving party, id. at 907-08, and the actions of the
government are "prima facie presumed correct." Id. at 908. Additionally, another for-
mer member of the Board of Tax Appeals noted that the taxpayer should have the burden
of proof because the evidence is peculiarly within the possession of the taxpayer. Id. at
930 (statement of Mr. Hamel); see id. at 907 (statement of Mr. Ivins).
58. Edward E. Gore, representing the American Institute of Accountants, argued
that the burden of proof should be on the Commissioner.
It seems to us that if the commissioner has a warrant for the imposition of an
additional assessment, the proof ought to be at hand, before him, and, having
the proof, it is no embarrassment for him to come before the Board of Tax
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sidered an amendment to the 1926 Revenue Act that would have shifted
this burden, the provision was rejected and the Board retained its author-
ity to fashion rules of procedure.5 9 Because Congress has granted the tax
court this rulemaking authority, 60 courts should limit their review of tax
court rules to whether that court has stayed within the bounds of the
congressional mandate. 6' Therefore, courts should defer to the Board's
Appeals and present the proof. We know of no reason why the right of the
taxpayer should be sacrificed to the convenience of the commissioner, where it
is a matter of the commissioner contending that the taxpayer is wrong.
1925 House Hearings, supra note 4, at 877; see also A. Hopkins, The United States Board
of Tax Appeals, 12 A.B.A.J. 466, 468 (1926) (asserting that threat of criminal and civil
sanctions were such significant guarantors of accuracy that individual's return should be
accorded prima facie correct status).
59. See H.R. Rep. No. 356, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1925). Thus, the broad grant of
authority to prescribe rules for Board proceedings was maintained as originally promul-
gated in 1924. Compare Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900(h), 43 Stat. 253, 337-38
(granting Board authority to promulgate own rules of procedure) with Revenue Act of
1926, ch. 27, § 907(a), 44 Stat. 9, 107 (same). The rule placing the burden of proof on
the taxpayer also has remained the same. Compare B.T.A. Rule 20 (1924) reprinted in G.
Holmes and K. Brewster Procedure and Practice Before the United States Board of Tax
Appeals 138 (1925) ("burden of proof shall be upon [the taxpayer]") with T. C. Rule
142(a), supra note 13, 5823A, at 66,178 ("The burden of proof shall be upon the [tax-
payer] ... except as otherwise provided by statute or determined by the Court ....").
60. See I.R.C. § 7453 ("the proceedings of the Tax Court... shall be conducted in
accordance with such rules of practice and procedure .. .as the Tax Court may
prescribe").
61. See McDonald v. Commissioner, 323 U.S. 57, 64 (1944) (Court should not dis-
place the views of the tax court and confine itself to determining whether tax court has
exceeded limits of authority).
The Supreme Court has held that review of the Secretary of the Treasury's rules re-
garding enforcement of the Internal Revenue Code must be deferential, see Rowan Cos.,
Inc. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 253 (1981) (when Commissioner acts under specific
authority, Court's primary inquiry is whether he acted within his delegation of author-
ity); United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 307 (1967) ("role of the judiciary ... begins
and ends with assuring that the Commissioner's regulations fall within his authority to
implement the congressional mandate"). The Court also has been deferential to rules in
other contexts such as administrating social security benefits, see Batterton v. Francis,
432 U.S. 416, 425-26 (1977) (when Congress delegated power to prescribe standards in 42
U.S.C. § 405(a) (1982), "the Secretary adopts regulations with legislative effect," and reg-
ulations should be deferred to unless Secretary exceeds his authority), rules for garnish-
ment of wages, see United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 834-36 (1984) (Secretary's
authority to prescribe rules and regulations for garnishments under 42 U.S.C. § 661(a)
(1982)), rules for federal financial assistance, see Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n,
463 U.S. 582, 613 (1983) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (agency's rules regard-
ing federal financial assistance established under grant of authority in 42 U.S.C. §
2000(d)(1) (1982)), and rules for medicaid payments, see Schweiker v. Gray Panthers,
453 U.S. 34, 43-44 (1981) (Commissioner's rules promulgated by Secretary of Health and
Human Resources under authority of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17)(b) (1982) should be
treated with deference). The Court also has been deferential to the Federal Labor Rela-
tion Authority's prescription of rules established under grant of authority in 5 U.S.C.
§ 7134 (1982), see Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. FLRA, 464 U.S. 89, 97-98
n.8 (1983), and the FCC's rules regarding procedures implementing licensing authority
contained in Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 4(j), 48 Stat. 1064, 1068 (codified at
47 U.S.C. § 154() (1982)), see FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137-38
(1940); see also Kaufman, Judicial Review of Agency Action: A Judge's Unburdening, 45
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 201, 209 (1970) (a judge must "ensure that the agency has complied with
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rule and uphold its placement of the burden of proof on the taxpayer.62
B. Self-Assessment and the Presumption of Correctness
By placing the burden of proof on the taxpayer, the presumption of
correctness forces the taxpayer to produce competent and sufficient evi-
dence to rebut the accuracy of the deficiency notice.63 The Code requires
the taxpayer to maintain adequate records of income and deductions.'
Tax liability, therefore, is based on facts and figures within the control of
the taxpayer.65 Placing the burden of proof on the taxpayer, therefore, is
consistent with the self assessment system of taxation.66
the established procedures"); Stem, Review of Findings of Administrators, Judges and
Juries: A Comparative Analysis, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 70, 106 (1944) (court's duty is to deter-
mine whether "the agency has stayed within the bounds for the exercise of discretion
fixed by Congress, and that it has applied the statutory standards and no others").
62. The grant of authority to the tax court under § 7453 of the Code is as broad as
any grants of authority to which courts have deferred. Compare I.R.C. § 7453 (1986)
(Tax Court proceedings "shall be conducted in accordance with such rules of practice
and procedure ... as the Tax Court may prescribe") with I.R.C. § 7805(a) (1986) ("Sec-
retary [of Treasury Department] shall prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the
enforcement of [the Code]") and 42 U.S.C. § 405(a) (1982) (Secretary [of Health and
Human Services] shall "make rules and regulations ... which are necessary or appropri-
ate to carry out [administration of social security benefits]") and 5 U.S.C. § 7134 (1982)
(FLRA "shall . . . prescribe rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of [the
Labor Management Relations Act]").
63. See supra notes 9 & 10 and accompanying text.
64. See I.R.C. § 6001 (1986) ("Every person liable for tax imposed by [the Code]...
shall keep such records, render such statements, make such returns, and comply with
such rules and regulations as the Secretary may from time to time prescribe.").
65. See Breland v. United States, 323 F.2d 492, 496 (5th Cir. 1963) (taxpayer has the
duty "to keep books and records of his income for the purpose of determining the correct
amount of income taxes due and payable"); Conforte v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1160,
1178 (1980) ("The [Code] and the self-assessment system place the responsibility of main-
taining records and substantiating claimed deductions upon the taxpayer."), modified,
692 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1982).
If the taxpayer fails to keep records or refuses to produce them, the Commissioner can
base the deficiency determination on any available information and still retain the pre-
sumption of correctness. See United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 517-18 (1943)
("[T]he government [does] not have to prove the exact amounts of unreported income by
[the taxpayer]. To require ... more meticulous proof ... that there were unreported
profits from an elaborately concealed illegal business, would be tantamount to holding
that skillful concealment is an invincible barrier to proof."); Breland v. United States, 323
F.2d 492, 496 (5th Cir. 1963) (Commissioner's reconstruction of taxpayer's liability is
presumed correct when taxpayer maintains no books or records); Durovic v. Commis-
sioner, 54 T.C. 1364, 1390 (1970) (when the taxpayer denies Commissioner's request to
produce records, he will not be able to avoid "any procedural. . . consequences flowing
from such a declination"), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 487 F.2d 36 (7th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 919 (1974).
66. During the hearings on the 1926 Revenue Act, members of the Board of Tax
Appeals testified that the burden of proof was placed on the taxpayer because the evi-
dence is peculiarly within his possession. See 1925 House Hearings, supra note 4, at 908,
930. One member of the Board testified that if the government had the burden of proof,
the tax laws should be repealed because there would be no way to enforce them. See id.
at 907 (statement of Mr. Ivins); see also supra note 18 and accompanying text (the system
of taxation depends on self-reporting).
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Granting the taxpayer's motion to shift the burden of proof to the
Commissioner requires the Commissioner to link the taxpayer to income
producing activity67 and, in some cases, to prove the amount of income
derived from this activity.68 Thus, the taxpayer, who has the greatest
access to relevent evidence,69 is freed from the burden of producing any
record of these activities and the Commissioner is required to prove his
case without such records.7 ° Moreover, the taxpayer who wishes to
avoid his tax liability can do so by withholding, destroying, or never cre-
ating the records needed to connect him with the income producing ac-
tivity.7 1 Granting a motion to shift the burden of proof to the
67. See Bradford v. Commissioner, 796 F.2d 303, 305 (9th Cir. 1986); Anastasato v.
Commissioner, 794 F.2d 884, 887 (3d Cir. 1986); Schaffer v. Commissioner, 779 F.2d 849,
858 (2d Cir. 1985); Walker v. Commissioner, 757 F.2d 36, 38 (3d Cir. 1985); Spatafore v.
United States, 752 F.2d 415, 418 (9th Cir. 1985); DiMauro v. United States, 706 F.2d 882,
884 (8th Cir. 1983).
68. See Schaffer v. Commissioner, 779 F.2d 849, 858-60 (2d Cir. 1985) (requiring
Commissioner to prove amount of income actually received by taxpayer from fraud con-
spiracy thereby allowing taxpayer to avoid the production of records). But see Mandina
v. Commissioner, 758 F.2d 1399, 1402-03 01th Cir. 1984) (granting Commissioner pre-
sumption of correctness on his allocation of unreported income received from fraud con-
spiracy). These cases were appealed from the same tax court decision that held that the
Commissioner's allocation of the unreported income was proper. See Mandina v. Com-
missioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 359, 372-73 (1982).
69. See Church of Scientology v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 381, 468 0984) ("Placing the
burden of proof on the taxpayer is... justified on the basis that the facts and figures on
which liability rests are peculiarly within the taxpayer's knowledge."); Duvoric v. Com-
missioner, 54 T.C. 1364, 1393 (1970) (because taxpayer is most familiar with facts, he
should have burden of producing evidence); Dubroff & Grossman, supra note 4, at 209
(burden of proving a tax item should be on party best able to produce evidence); 1925
House Hearings, supra note 4, at 930 (statement of Mr. Hamel) (taxpayer should be
required to produce evidence because he has best evidence and because evidence is pecu-
liarly within his possession); Comment, Burden of Proof in Tax Litigation: Offset and
Equitable Recoupment, 15 Buffalo L. Rev. 616, 617 (1966) (same); cf. Campbell v. United
States, 365 U.S. 85, 96 (1961) (burden of proof should not be on one litigant when facts to
be established are within the knowledge of the adversary); Wigmore, supra note 5,
§ 2486, at 290 (burden of proof is put on party who has "peculiar means of knowledge"
of the facts); Morgan, Instructing the Jury Upon Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 47
Harv. L. Rev. 59, 79 (1933) (courts sometimes create presumptions to take into account
evidence that "establishes a fact is peculiarily accessible to one of the parties").
70. Although Tax Court Rule 70(a)(1), supra note 13, 5821N, at 66,135, provides
for formal discovery procedures, these procedures to a large degree are voluntary. See
Garbis, supra note 2, $ 6.01, at 6-2. The Commissioner does have administrative sum-
mons power to compel discovery, see I.R.C. § 7602, but this power is not effective against
taxpayers who wish to evade their tax liability by avoiding or effectively concealing recor-
dation. See United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 517 0943) ("It is not to be expected
that the actual financial transactions of such a vast illicit business would appear by direct
proof."); Jackson v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 394, 405-06 (1979) (Quealy, J., dissenting)
(recognizing that individuals who derive income from illegal activities, such as the sale of
narcotics, do not keep books or records but deal only in cash; courts should be receptive
to Commissioner's determinations that are not based upon conventional sources).
71. See United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 517-18 (1943); DiMauro v. United
States, 706 F.2d 882, 885 (8th Cir. 1983); Llorente v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 260, 268
(1980), aff'd in part rev'd in part, 649 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1981); cf. 1925 House Hearings,
supra note 4, at 930 (statement of Mr. Hamel) (records of income are under taxpayer's
control and, therefore, taxpayer is in best position to prove amount of tax liability).
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Commissioner thus undermines the recordkeeping requirements of the
Code.72 Indeed, one former member of the Board of Tax Appeals noted
that if the burden of proof is placed on the Commissioner, taxpayers
would effectively have the option of deciding whether they wanted to
satisfy their tax liability.73
C. The Need to Facilitate the Swift Collection of Revenue
The efficient functioning of government requires the swift and cost-
effective collection of revenues.7 4 In determining procedural rules for the
adjudication of tax disputes, courts should select rules that best facilitate
this goal without compromising the right of the taxpayer to be free from
erroneous assessments. Courts requiring that the Commissioner carry
the initial burden of proving that the deficiency notice was not formu-
lated in an arbitrary manner,76 in effect, bifurcate the trial proceeding.77
This increases the cost and duration of tax litigation, and interferes with
the swift collection of revenue. Because there are safeguards against er-
roneous assessments, courts should not allow the burden of proof to be
shifted.78
D. The Party Best Able to Bear the Burden of Proof
Courts and commentators assert that the taxpayer should not be re-
quired to carry the initial burden of proof because the taxpayer may be
72. Since absent these records, the taxpayer will have a liability assessed against him
as determined by the Commissioner, the taxpayer is encouraged to keep such records as a
means of minimizing this assessment. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (Code's
recordkeeping requirements).
73. See 1925 House Hearings, supra note 4, at 907 (statement of Mr. Ivins).
74. See Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 259 (1935) ("[Tjaxes are the life blood of
the government, and their prompt and certain availability an imperious need."); Carson
v. United States, 560 F.2d 693, 696 (5th Cir. 1977) ("The jurisprudence finds justification
for the presumption that assessments are correct and for the taxpayer's burden of proof in
the strong need of the government to accomplish swift collection of revenues .. .);
Higginbotham v. United States, 556 F.2d 1173, 1175 (4th Cir. 1977) (recognizing the gov-
ernment's interest in facilitating the collection of taxes); Church of Scientology v. Com-
missioner, 83 T.C. 381, 468 (1984) (same).
75. Prior to the 1924 Revenue Act, a taxpayer did not have a judicial forum where he
could litigate a tax assessment without first paying it. See H. Dubroff, supra note 56, at
28. To alleviate this problem, Congress created the Board of Tax Appeals to allow the
taxpayer to have their tax assessment redetermined prior to payment. See supra note 39.
The Board was comprised of taxation experts, see Avery v. Commissioner, 22 F.2d 6, 8
(5th Cir. 1927), and, accordingly, Congress decided to allow the court to establish their
own rules of procedure. See H. Dubroff, supra note 56, at 61. The Board decided that it
would be in the Government's best interest to place the burden of production on the
taxpayer. See supra note 57. This decision has remained unchanged. See Tax Court Rule
142(a), supra note 6, 1 5820, at 66,092.
76. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
77. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
78. See infra notes 100-108 and accompanying text; Morgan, supra note 70, at 79
(presumptions are called into existence because of public policy); Wigmore, supra note 5,
§ 2486, at 291 (same).
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incapable of proving a negative.79 They reason that because the Commis-
sioner is faced with proving an affirmative, he should be required to bear
the initial burden of production. 0
This analysis, however, ignores certain realities of tax litigation. The
Commissioner, when called on to prove the non-arbitrariness of the defi-
ciency notice, must do so with substantive evidence.8" This evidence usu-
ally is contained in the taxpayer's records that remain in the taxpayer's
control.8 2
Further, in many cases involving illegal activities, the taxpayer does
not keep records of his income producing activity.83 Thus, courts requir-
ing the Commissioner to prove the affirmative with evidence that often is
not available,8 4 allow the taxpayer to benefit from his disregard of the
Code's recordkeeping requirement.85 The Commissioner may be unable
to produce sufficient evidence to link the taxpayer to the income produc-
ing activity,86 or to demonstrate that the amount assessed was not arbi-
79. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
80. See Anastasato v. Commissioner, 794 F.2d 884, 887 (3d Cir. 1986); Karme v.
Commissioner, 673 F.2d 1062, 1065 (9th cir. 1982); Rockwell v. Commissioner, 512 F.2d
882, 886 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 423 U.S. 1015 (1975); 1925 House Hearings, supra note
4, at 877 (statement of Mr. Gore); Note, Proving a Negative, supra note 8, at 154.
81. See Walker v. Commissioner, 757 F.2d 36, 41-42 (3d Cir. 1985); Weimerskirch v.
Commissioner, 596 F.2d 358, 360 (9th Cir. 1979); Llorente v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 260,
265 (1980), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 649 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1981). But see Avery v.
Commissioner, 574 F.2d 467, 468 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (court allowed Commis-
sioner to use inadmissible hearsay to prove the deficiency notice was not arbitrarily
assessed).
82. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
The Tax Court acknowledges the Commissioner's position and does not consider the
question of arbitrariness until the taxpayer presents evidence that the Commissioner ac-
ted arbitrarily. See Shriver v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 1, 3 0985); Greenberg's Express,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 324, 327 (1974); Giddio v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1530,
1532 (1970); see also Rosano v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 681, 687 (1966) ("[W]e know of
no rule of law calling for a review of the materials that were before the Commissioner in
order to ascertain whether he relied upon improper evidence . .
The Giddio court stated:
Nowhere in the Code is there a provision which specifies the nature and quality
of the evidence which the tax administrator must gather to support the determi-
nation.... The absence of statutory guidelines suggests that Congress intended
that the [IRS] should have great latitude in making determinations of liability,
particularly where the taxpayer files no returns and refuses to cooperate in the
ascertainment of his income.
Giddio, 54 T.C. at 1533 (citations omitted).
The Tax Court's rationale for not making a preliminary examination of the deficiency
notice for arbitrariness is that their trial is a proceeding de novo; the determination is
based on the merits of the case and not any previous record developed at the administra-
tion level. See Anastasato v. Commissioner, 794 F.2d 884, 887 (3d Cir. 1986); Jackson v.
Commissioner, 73 T.C. 394, 400 (1979).
83. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 67 to 72 and accompanying text.
85. Id.
86. See Schaffer v. Commissioner, 779 F.2d 849, 858-60 (2d Cir. 1985) (fraud
scheme); Walker v. Commissioner, 757 F.2d 36, 42 (3d Cir. 1985) (numbers operation);
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trary8 7 because the taxpayer failed to keep or produce records of his
illegal enterprise.8" Under this rule, taxpayers earning income from vari-
ous illegal activities89 can escape tax liability successfully because the
Commissioner may be unable to carry the initial burden of production.90
Granting the motion to shift the burden, therefore, may protect taxpay-
ers who have violated both criminal and tax laws.91
Llorente v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d 152, 156-57 (2d Cir. 1981) (drug dealing); DeCaval-
cante v. Commissioner, 620 F.2d 23, 28 (3d Cir. 1980) (gambling activity).
87. See Weimerskirch v. Commissioner, 596 F.2d 358, 365 (9th Cir. 1979) (deficiency
notice found arbitrary because Commissioner's evidence not sufficient to link taxpayer to
drug dealing); Dellacroce v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 269, 287 (1984) (deficiency notice
found arbitrary because Commissioner's evidence not sufficient to link taxpayer to receipt
of racketeering payments); Jackson v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 394, 401 (1979) (deficiency
notice found arbitrary because Commissioner's evidence not sufficient to link taxpayer to
drug dealing).
88. See United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 517 (1943) (unlikely that actual
records of the illegal enterprise would appear by direct proof); Jackson v. Commissioner,
73 T.C. 394, 405-06 (1979) (Quealy, J., dissenting) (no records kept of narcotics dealings
made in cash); supra note 69 and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., Weimerskirch v. Commissioner, 596 F.2d 358, 359 (9th Cir. 1979) (nar-
cotics); Gerardo v. Commissioner, 552 F.2d 549, 553 (3d Cir. 1977) (gambling); Piz-
zarello v. United States, 408 F.2d 579, 580-81 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 986
(1969); Dellacroce v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 269, 276 (1984) (racketeering payofi);
Llorente v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 260, 261 (1980) (drugs), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 649
F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1981).
90. See Schaffer v. Commissioner, 779 F.2d 849, 858 (2d Cir. 1985) (Commissioner
unable to carry initial burden of production demonstrating taxpayer's earnings from
fraud scheme); Walker v. Commissioner, 757 F.2d 36, 42 (3d Cir. 1985) (Commissioner
unable to carry initial burden of production of linking taxpayer to numbers operation).
The Supreme Court has recognized that when a taxpayer is linked with criminal activ-
ity, it is unlikely that the taxpayer will produce evidence to demonstrate the correct tax
liability. See United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 517 (1943); see also Jackson v.
Commissioner, 73 T.C. 394, 405-06 (Quealy, J., dissenting) (recognizing that individuals
who derive income from illegal activities, such as the sale of narcotics, do not keep books
or records but deal only in cash). The only way to force the taxpayer to reveal all the
evidence in his possession is to preserve the rule placing the burden of proof on the tax-
payer. Otherwise, the taxpayer who wishes to avoid his tax liability can do so by destroy-
ing or never creating the records needed to connect him with the income producing
activity. See United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 517-18 (1943); DiMauro v. Commis-
sioner, 706 F.2d 882, 885 (8th Cir. 1983); Mendelson v. Commissioner, 305 F.2d 519, 523
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 877 (1962); Jackson v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 394, 405-
06 (1979) (Quealy, J., dissenting); cf. 1925 House Hearings, supra note 4, at 930 (taxpayer
has control of records that are needed to calculate tax liability).
91. See Schaffer v. Commissioner, 779 F.2d 849, 857, 859-60 (2d Cir. 1985) (Commis-
sioner proved that taxpayer was involved in a conspiracy to defraud; but could not prove
amount of proceeds received); Walker v. Commissioner, 757 F.2d 36, 40 (3d Cir. 1985)
(Commissioner demonstrated taxpayer's involvement with gambling activities on two oc-
cassions, but could not prove continuous involvement); see also Llorente v. Commis-
sioner, 74 T.C. 260 (1980), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 649 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1981).
What has developed seems to be a different standard for taxpayers allegedly
engaged in illegal activities than for other types of taxpayers. The result is a
more lenient rule in tax cases for those who may well have violated laws not
involving taxes .... Such persons are entitled to have the tax laws applied to
them in the same manner as others, but such treatment is all they are entitled to
expect or receive.
Id. at 280 (Tannenwald, J., concurring); accord, id. at 272 (Fay, J., concurring).
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Courts following the traditional approach recognize that the Commis-
sioner's deficiency notice may have to rest on otherwise inadmissible evi-
dence.92 Accordingly, these courts grant the Commissioner the
presumption of correctness to prevent the taxpayer from escaping his lia-
bility by failing to keep records necessary to the court's determination of
the correct tax liability.93 These courts, however, recognize the difficulty
facing the taxpayer when he is called on to prove a negative. 94 Thus,
when the taxpayer presents credible testimony and other evidence, but
fails to carry his burden of production, the court may not allow the Com-
missioner to rest on the presumption of correctness.95 The Commis-
sioner may be required to produce evidence linking the taxpayer to the
alleged income producing activity. 96 This procedure, however, does not
act to change the operation of the burden of proof, rather, it relaxes the
quantum of proof needed to satisfy the initial production requirement.9"
Commentators suggest that the taxpayer should be able to carry his
initial burden of production simply by presenting a sworn affidavit that
he did not receive the alleged income.98 They assert that the present
92. See supra note 84.
93. See supra note 65.
94. See Schaffer v, Commissioner, 779 F.2d 849, 858 (2d Cir. 1985); Llorente v. Com-
missioner, 74 T.C. 260, 277 (1980) (Tannenwald, J., concurring), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 649 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1981); Mertens, supra note 4, § 50.61, at 196.
95. See Jackson v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 394, 401 0979); Human Eng'g Inst. v.
Commissioner, 61 T.C. 61, 66 0973).
96. See Jackson v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 394, 401 0979); Human Eng'g Inst. v.
Commissioner, 61 T.C. 61, 66 (1973).
97. See Llorente v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 260, 277 (1980) (Tannenwald, J., concur-
ring) (taxpayer should face a lesser burden of proof when faced with proving non-receipt
of income), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 649 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1981); Schildhaus v. Com-
missioner, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 1463, 1470 (1969) (taxpayer has lower burden of proof)
(citing 9 J. Mertens, The Law of Federal Income Taxation § 50.61, at 157 (1982)); see
also Saunders, supra note 90, at 284-86 (discussing cases where burden of proof is eased).
98. See Note, Proving a Negative, supra note 8, at 153. There are several serious flaws
with this view. First, if simply swearing out an affadavit attesting to the accuracy of the
tax return was the only requirement to vouch for a taxpayer's honesty in reporting in-
come, there would be no need for IRS examinations to enforce the Code. See supra note
29-34 and accompanying text. In addition, presenting a sworn affidavit merely repeats
the signature and verification requirements of the Code. Section 6061 of the Code re-
quires that the return be signed, see I.R.C. § 6061 (1986), and § 6065 requires that the
return be "verified by a written declaration that [the return] is made under the penalties
of perjury." I.R.C. § 6065 (1986). Thus, the taxpayer, when associated with unreported
income, has already sworn that the return is accurate and if he falsified the return at that
time, he probably will do so again.
Non-compliance with tax laws has significantly grown over the past several years. See
J. Henry, Non compliance with U.S. Tax Law-Evidence on Size, Growth, and Composi-
tion, 1983 A.B.A. Sec. of Tax'n, Income Tax Compliance Rep. 15, 18. The IRS esti-
mated that legally generated income that went unreported in 1976 amounted to between
$75 billion and $100 billion, which in terms of lost tax dollars totaled between S13 and
$17 billion per year and the estimated income relating to illegal sources which went unre-
ported was between $25 and $35 billion, or $6 to $9 billion in lost taxes. See B. Bittker,
supra note 4, 112.1.1 and n.9, at 112-4, and appendix-tables 23-25.
Unreporting and underreporting of income is prevalent in industries with workers who
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procedure does not account for the honest taxpayer who could be
charged with receiving income and have no way of proving the deficiency
notice erroneous or arbitrary. 99
Various administrative safeguards, however, are aimed at preventing
erroneous or arbitrary assessment."° Additionally, the taxpayer has the
opportunity to have his case decided on two levels of review.10' Each
must agree, without relying whatsoever on any prior investigation, that
the taxpayer did in fact receive unreported income or the case is dis-
missed.'O2 First, the taxpayer has the opportunity for appeal at the IRS
Appeals Office after the deficiency notice issues. 0 3 Second, in the tax
court, the taxpayer alleged to have unreported income is faced with a
relatively low production burden," and if he presents credible evi-
dence, 10 5 the court does not allow the Commissioner to rest on the pre-
sumption of correctness.10 6 The court makes its determination based
solely on the evidence before it.1°7 These procedures safeguard the hon-
est taxpayer from a tax liability that is not his responsibility. Therefore,
shifting the burden of proof to the Commissioner is not necessary to pro-
tect the honest taxpayer. Rather, it only serves to place an unjustifiable
evidentiary burden on the government, which has attempted to insure
that the assessment has a rationale foundation.108
E. Administrative Actions of the Government are Presumed Correct
The tax court's decision to place the burden of proof on the taxpayer is
escape withholding on the theory that they are independent contractors rather than em-
ployees. See id., 1 112.1.1 and n.10, at 112-4.
99. See Note, Proving a Negative, supra note 8, at 153; Note, Deficiency Assessments,
supra note 10, at 658.
100. IRS agents are instructed that issues can only be raised when they have sufficient
basis and merit. See Rev. Proc. 64-22, 1964-1 C.B. 689. If a deficiency is found, a notice
is not sent until it is checked by the agents's supervisor for sufficient basis and given a
technical and procedural review by the review staff. See M. Saltzman, supra note 1, V
8.07[2], at 8-69, % 8.08[3], at 8-76 to 8-77.
101. See infra notes 105 & 106 - 109 and accompanying text.
102. See infra notes 105 - 109 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 34 and accompanying text.
104. Courts reason that a taxpayer required to prove non-receipt of income may face
practical difficulties in doing so and, therefore, require him to produce a lesser quantum
of evidence to meet his burden of proof. See Llorente v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 260, 277
(1980) (Tannenwald, J., concurring), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 649 F.2d 152 (2d Cir.
1981); Schildhaus v. Commissioner, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 1463, 1470 (1969).
105. The decision as to what constitutes credible evidence is made by the trier of fact.
See Weirmerskirch v. Commissioner, 596 F.2d 358, 359-60 (9th Cir. 1979) (findings of
court are to be respected unless clearly erroneous).
106. See supra notes 97 - 98 and accompanying text.
107. The Tax Court conducts a de novo proceeding and bases its determination of the
taxpayer's liability on the merits of the case and not on any previous record developed at
the administrative level. See Riland v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 185, 201 (1982); Jackson v.
Commissioner, 73 T.C. 394, 400 (1979); Greenberg's Express, Inc. v. Commissioner, 62
T.C. 324, 328 (1974).
108. See supra notes 23 - 33 and accompanying text.
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validated by the general principle that administrative actions of the gov-
ernment are presumed correct.1°9 Indeed, the Supreme Court has held
that administrative actions of the IRS resulting in a deficiency assessment
have the effect of a judgment after trial.1"' This presumption is sup-
ported by IRS internal controls and review procedures that must be satis-
fied before the issuance of a deficiency notice.11' Courts requiring the
Commissioner to put forth substantial evidence to earn the presumption,
however, require that every deficiency notice be checked for substance'I 2
and, therefore, accept the possibility that IRS procedures may be insuffi-
cient to safeguard against arbitrary assessments. Although this is con-
trary to the traditional presumption of administrative regularity, 1 3 it
implicitly recognizes that for such procedures to be effective, they must
be observed.' 14 To protect the taxpayer from improper assessments,
these courts instead should hold that the taxpayer rebuts the presump-
tion of correctness if he can demonstrate that the Commissioner failed to
109. During the hearings on the 1926 Revenue Act, a former member of the Board of
Tax Appeals testified that the burden of proof was placed on the taxpayer because actions
of the assessing officers are "prima facie presumed correct." See 1925 House Hearings,
supra note 4, at 908 (statement of Mr. J. Ivins); see also Phillips v. Commissioner, 283
U.S. 589, 600 (1931) ("administrative findings on issues of fact are accepted by the court
as conclusive"); Higginbotham v. United States, 556 F.2d 1173, 1175 (4th Cir. 1977)
(recognizing "presumption of administrative regularity" of government actions); United
States v. Rexach, 482 F.2d 10, 16 (1st Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1039 (1973);
Dubroff & Grossman, supra note 4, at 209 ("When the Board... chose to place the
burden of proof on the taxpayer, it was following a long recognized principle that admin-
istrative actions of Government are presumed correct.") (footnotes omitted).
110. See Bull v. United States, 293 U.S. 247, 260 (1935).
111. See supra notes 23 - 35 and accompanying text.
IRS agents are instructed that their function is to administrate the Code.
Tax policy for raising revenue is determined by Congress.
With this in mind, it is the duty of the Service to carry out that policy by
correctly applying the laws enacted by Congress; to determine the reasonable
meaning of various Code provisions in light of the Congressional purpose in
enacting them; and to perform this work in a fair and impartial manner, with
neither a government or taxpayer point of view.
Rev. Proc. 64-22, 1964- C.B. 689. In addition, the Commissioner's instructions state
that the construction of the Code should not be strained to obtain revenue and that issues
should only be raised "when they have merit [and] never arbitrarily or for trading pur-
poses." Id. See also Rev. Proc. 74-18, 1974-1 C.B. 440 (statement of organization and
functions) ("The mission of the Service is to... maintain the highest degree of public
confidence in the integrity and efficiency of the Service.").
112. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
113. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
114. In several recent cases, the IRS has issued deficiency notices without following
their prescribed procedures. See, e.g., DeCavalante v. Commissioner, 620 F.2d 23, 28 (3d
Cir. 1980) (Commissioner made assessment for years 1965 to 1970, however, there was
no evidence of gambling before 1968; Commissioner's only argument was that the gam-
bling operation involved "manifestly did not arise overnight."); Carson v. United States,
560 F.2d 693, 697-98 (5th Cir. 1977) (Commissioner's assessment for 1970-71 period was
unsupported and the Commissioner relied solely on the presumption of correctness); Ge-
rardo v. Commissioner, 552 F.2d 549, 554 (3d Cir. 1977) (Commissioner made assess-
ment from April 4, 1966, but began investigation on August 5, 1966. There was no
evidence linking taxpayer to the gambling activity from the April 4 assessment date.).
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follow administrative procedures or did not base the assessment on an
established fact. 115 By doing so, the courts force the Commissioner to
adhere to the administrative procedures on which the presumption rests,
without placing undue evidentiary burdens on the government or creat-
ing costly and time consuming bifurcated litigation.
CONCLUSION
The presumption is an effective procedural device for the Commis-
sioner because it requires the taxpayer to produce records and other sub-
stantive evidence to determine the correct tax liability. This is fair and
consistent with the self-assessment system of taxation because records
needed to establish or refute tax liability are available only to the tax-
payer. The presumption helps facilitate the swift collection of taxes by
preventing time-consuming and costly litigation.
The presumption of correctness is granted to the Commissioner be-
cause of the internal controls and review procedures used by the IRS to
ensure that the honest taxpayer is not assessed improperly. To ensure
that the Commissioner follows these procedures, courts should find that
the taxpayer has rebutted the presumption of correctness if he can
demonstrate that such procedures were not followed. Thus, the impor-
tant policy reasons for and procedural effectiveness of the presumption of
correctness is available to the Commissioner and the taxpayer is pro-
tected from arbitrary and erroneous assessments.
Sean M. Moran
115. An example of an established fact is an information return (such as a partnership
return or a W-2 form) or a criminal conviction which supports the assessment of unre-
ported income (such as illegal gambling or sales of narcotics). The taxpayer can deter-
mine the underlying facts the Commissioner used to determine his deficiency notice by
the use of the tax courts discovery procedures. See Tax Court Rule 70(a)(l), supra note
6, 5821N, at 66,135.
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